Innovations are a key factor to ensure the competitiveness of establishments as well as to enhance the growth and wealth of nations. But more than any other economic activity, decisions about innovations are plagued by failures of the market mechanism. As a response, public instruments have been implemented to stimulate private innovation activities. The effectiveness of these measures, however, is ambiguous and calls for an empirical evaluation. In this paper we make use of the IAB Establishment Panel and apply various microeconometric methods to estimate the effect of public measures on innovation activities of German establishments. We find that neglecting sample selection due to observable as well as to unobservable characteristics leads to an overestimation of the treatment effect and that there are considerable differences with regard to size class and between West and East-German establishments.
Introduction
Innovations are crucial, not only from an individual firm perspective but also from an economy wide viewpoint. However, more than any other economic activity, decisions about innovations and R&D expenditures are plagued by failures of the market mechanism. Innovations represent new knowledge which could be imitated or even stolen by competitors.
Furthermore, research as well as the development of new products is a risky and uncertain undertaking and thus must be financed out of own financial resources or venture capital which are both scarce, especially in Germany. As a result of these spillover effects, financial constraints, uncertainties and risk aversion, the level of private innovation activities will be below the social optimum.
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All OECD countries are aware of these problems as well as of the importance of technological change and innovations for the future growth.
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As a response, public instruments have been implemented to overcome this dilemma and to stimulate private innovation activities. One of the oldest in this context are patents which were already implemented in Germany in 1877. Additionally there are various other instruments. Some of them, like competition policy or technology transfer, act more indirectly while others, e.g. tax incentive schemes and subsidies, operate in a more direct way to induce innovation activities.
In 2000 total R&D spending in Germany amounted to e 49.8 billions. Thereby a considerable fraction was financed by the government. The total public R&D-expenditures amounted to e 15.9 billions with e 2.6 billions paid directly to establishments in form of R&D-subsidies.
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The rationale for such measures is to increase the innovation incentives of establishments by lowering marginal costs of R&D and to decrease uncertainties regarding planning reliability. In addition to these direct effects at the establishment level, positive indirect impacts are expected to arise due to spillover effects, e.g. when new technologies and products diffuse and are adopted by other establishments.
However, counteracting effects have to be taken into account as well: At the individual level it could be the case e.g. that establishments would have undertaken innovation activities also in the absence of subsidies or that public R&D-expenditures only crowd out private ones. On a more aggregated level subsidized establishments could rule out non-subsidized ones. The net effect of public R&D policy on innovation activities is thus not clear cut and calls for an empirical evaluation. In order to be thorough and complete, such an evaluation has to address the following questions:
1. Does the subsidy affect a firms behavior, especially with regard to innovation activities, i.e. what is the causal effect of public subsidies on the individual establishment?
2. Are the individual impacts large enough to yield a social net-benefit or are they counteracted by crowding out effects, i.e. what are the aggregated macroeconomic effects of such subsidies?
3. Is the identified net-benefit the best outcome that could have been achieved for the money spent?
This study picks up the first question, i.e. estimates the microeconomic effect of policy measures on the innovation activity of German establishments. Thereby we will focus on financial measures, like e.g. subsidies, tax incentives and public credits. Despite the considerable amount of money spent and tight public budgets, empirical evidence, especially for Germany, is rather limited. Table 1 contains a synopsis of studies known to us which all point to the view that public R&D subsidies have a positive impact on private R&D and innovation activities.
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These studies differ with regard to the empirical strategy and outcome variable but all make use of the same dataset, namely the Mannheim Innovation Panel.
This paper adds a new piece of evidence to the ongoing political debate about the effectiveness of public R&D measures in the innovation process. An alternative represen-4 For an overview of international studies see Klette, Møen, and Griliches (2000) or David, Hall, and Toole (2000) who surveyed 19 (14) studies on an establishment (sectoral) level from which 10 (12) revealed a complementary relation between public and private R&D expenditures. Irwin and Klenow (1996) analyzed the SEMATECH consortium in the American semiconductor industry while Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) focused on Japanese research consortia. Lerner (1998) examined the small business innovation research program in the United States while the studies of Griliches and Regev (1999) and Klette and Møen (1999) analyze the situation in Israel and Norway, respectively. tative dataset, namely the IAB establishment panel is used and special attention paid to the problem of sample selection due to observable as well as unobservable covariates. In the next section we will present the dataset as well as some first descriptive results. Section three addresses the problem of sample selection due to observable characteristics by estimating various matching and probit models. Section four additionally takes unobservable characteristics into account by employing simultaneous probit models and conducting a conditional difference in differences estimator. Section five concludes the paper.
Data and first results
The IAB Establishment Panel conducted by the German Federal Employment Office started as a reaction to a situation of lacking information about the demand side of the labor market.
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Its population are all firms employing at least one employee subject to the compulsory social security scheme. The unit of interest is the establishment, i.e. the unit where economic activities take place.
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All establishments reporting to the German Federal Employment Office are collected in the establishment file from which a stratified representative sample is drawn.
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The IAB Panel started in 1993 with 4,365 establishments and an average response rate of 71%. After the first wave most of these establishments were re-examined. Additionally, the panel was complemented by first time or repeated 5 See Hamermesh (1996) and Bellmann (1997) . 6 One advantage of the IAB Establishment Panel is that it includes all establishments and does not impose a minimum requirement regarding employment size or turnover. The Mannheim Innovation Panel e.g. includes only establishments with at least five employees.
7 The stratification cells are defined by establishment size and industry sector. The selection probability increases with employment size therefore leading to an over-representation of large establishments. registered firms. In 1996 East-German establishments were also included in the panel which in 2001 contained about 17,650 establishments.
The panel is organized in a modular form. There are topics covered annually like changes in the level and structure of employment, questions about employment policy, business volume and investment. Other topics are only covered irregularly, e.g. information about innovations which are latest available for 1999/2000. Additionally there is also a special questionnaire about actual topics included into the panel every year.
For our analysis we assume a dependency structure according to figure 1: We focus on innovation activities of establishments in 1999 and 2000 and analyze whether they were influenced by public subsidies granted during the years 1997 and 1998. 8 In terms of the evaluation literature, the innovation decision is the outcome and granted subsidies the treatment variable. Additionally to the treatment variable we also consider a set of covariates from 1997 and 1998 which might have an impact on the outcome variable. The treatment variable itself, i.e. the decision whether or not an establishment has received a subsidy, is assumed to be determined by exogenous variables in 1996. Keeping this time structure in mind, the sample used for the estimation was constructed as follows: In a first step we maintained those establishments which participated continuously in the panel from 1997 until 2001 yielding a sample size of 5,569 observations.
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In order to isolate the impact of subsidies granted in 1997/1998, we excluded those establishments which received a subsidy in 1999/2000 which reduces our sample size 8 Our dataset only contains information about the innovation decision of establishments referring to the last two years.
9 Notice that a questionnaire in year t contains mainly information for year t − 1.
to 3,164 establishments.
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Finally we excluded establishments from the agricultural and public sector which leaves us with 2,714 observations. Establishments which received at least one of these measures are regarded as treated establishments. Although an obvious shortcoming of such an aggregation is that we are not able to disentangle the effects of different measures, several reasons argue for such a
proceeding. An obvious one is the necessity to increase the number of observations, e.g. the number of establishments which received federal funds amounts to 77 thus making a reliable estimation of the treatment effect difficult.
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Another reason concerns the fact that a considerable number of establishments received more than one type of measure so that for these cases a disjunction of the individual effect is not possible.
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And finally, since 10 We were not able to consider public subsidies granted in 1996 because the questionnaire changed between 1996 and 1997 so that the subsidies are not comparable.
11 This argument becomes more convincing if one considers that for a reliable estimation we also have to include industrial and regional dummies in the estimation which will reduce degrees of freedom considerably.
12 In our dataset these were 121 of 492 establishments. the various measures granted by different institutions follow the same objectives, namely to increase the competitiveness and innovation capacity of establishments, it makes sense to focus on the total effect of all public subsidies instead on separate measures. Another feature is the obvious correlation between establishment size and participation rate, e.g. the participation rate for small and medium sized establishments (SME) with 10-250 employees amounts to 24.36% and rises to 32.79% for the group of large establishments with more than 250 employees.
13
Since most of the programs place a special emphasis on SME and East-German establishments, all of the following estimations will be conducted separately for these groups. 14 See e.g. Czarnitzki (2001) for a discussion of the transition problems in East-Germany.
14
tage is the fact that especially smaller establishments do not feature a separate R&D department and thus no explicit R&D expenditures incur. In the case of smaller establishments, innovations are rather generated through practical experience and as a result R&D expenditures would underestimate innovation activities. Another issue concerns the input character of R&D expenditures which do not necessarily reflect the success of the R&D efforts. Since especially new products and services determine the future success and competitiveness of a single firm as well as the economy as a whole, it is more reasonable to focus on an output based measure of the innovation process.
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In particular we will consider a broad and a narrow innovation concept depending on whether establishments have -improved an already existing product/service, introduced an incremental product innovation, i.e. a product which is new for the own establishment but not new for the market, or even a radical product innovation for which a new market had to be A first and tempting proceeding to assess the impact of public subsidies is to compare the share of innovative establishments in the group of treated and non treated establishments respectively. Again we see a familiar structure: Innovative establishments are those with a higher qualified staff, R&D departments, more R&D cooperations and a newer equipment. It thus seems that there is a set of variables which have the same impact on both the innovation decision and the fact whether an establishment has received a subsidy or not. This positive sample selection has to be taken into account out of the following reason: If establishments which have a higher probability to innovate anyway are also those establishments which are more likely to receive a public subsidy, a simple mean comparison would yield an upward biased estimate of the true treatment effect. In the following section we will present appropriate estimation strategies which explicitly account for this sample selection mechanism due to observable covariates.
Sample selection on observable covariates
In this section the sample selection as well as the fundamental evaluation problem will be analyzed in more depth. Let us introduce some notation to this aim. Let D i be the is unobservable for subsidized and Y i (1) for non-subsidized establishments. Hence, the individual treatment effect ∆ i is not identified and we have to turn to the average effect for the entire population or a sub-sample by taking the expectation of (1):
Equation (2) gives the average treatment effect for the entire population, i.e. in our case it answers the question which impact a subsidy has on a randomly picked establishment. In practice, however, most studies do not focus on ∆
AT E
but instead condition on participation and estimate the so called treatment effect on the treated given by
estimates the effect of subsidies for those who actually received such a measure, i.e. the mean gain for participants. In the appendix we will give a more thorough justification for its use in our context. Looking at equation (3) A simple mean comparison by treatment status, which we conducted previously:
will only yield an unbiased estimate of ∆
AT E|D
if assignment to treatment and potential outcomes of non-treated establishments are independent, i.e. if treatment assignment is ignorable or formally Y (0)⊥D.
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In this case the bias term E[Y
This independence assumption is unlikely to hold outside a non-experimental setting but is more likely to be fulfilled in our application if we additionally take a set of covariates, X, into account. If the following conditional independence assumption holds:
and the average treatment effect on the treated can be estimated by taking the expectation of the following expression over the distribution of X|D i = 1:
is obtained as a weighted average of contrasts between the outcome variable of subsidized and non-subsidized establishments at each value of X.
Such a balanced comparison controls for all observable differences between subsidized and non-subsidized establishments.
Estimation strategies
One possible estimation strategy based on (6) is to stratify the dataset into cells defined by combinations of each value of X, to calculate within each cell, i.e. conditional on X, the difference between the means of the outcome variables for treated and non-treated establishments and, finally, to average these differences over the distribution of X. Under the assumption that the selection process is solely due to observable covariates captured in X, this exact cell matching will yield an unbiased estimate of the "true" treatment effect on the treated.
More intuitively, a matching estimator tries to approximate the counterfactual outcome by finding in a large group of non-participants those "twin"-establishments which are similar to the participating ones in all aspects except for the fact that they have not received a public subsidy. That being done and if we can assume that the selection process is only due to observable covariates, the difference in the outcome variable between participating and matched not-participating establishments is solely attributable to the program. In that sense matching estimators simulate an experimental setting.
A practical obstacle of such a proceeding lies in the so called dimensionality problem.
If our vector of covariates X e.g. contains K binary variables, the number of cells amounts to 2
K
. If there are also continuous variables like it is the case in our dataset, it becomes even more likely that in some cells there will be only treated or untreated establishments and hence a mean comparison for these cells cannot be conducted.
As a resort, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed the concept of propensity score matching. Defining the propensity score as the conditional probability to participate, i.e.
and hence one needs not condition on all covariates contained in X but only on the propensity score p(X).
Given the above implication, a variety of matching protocols can be used to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated which all have the following steps in common: 18 1. Estimate the propensity score using e.g. a probit or logit model.
2. Match treated establishments with those non-treated establishments which are similar regarding the propensity score.
3. Calculate the mean of the outcome variable for treated and matched control establishments. The difference in the means may serve as an estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated.
Some comments might be helpful regarding the first and second step. The quality of the matching estimator heavily depends on the quality of the estimation of the propensity score and whether the so called balancing property is fulfilled. The balancing property states that for a given p(X), treated and control establishments should have the same distribution of X. If this is the case, the differences in the outcome variables are solely attributable to participation. If, however, treated and matched controls are still different in terms of observable covariates after the matching, the estimated treatment effect on the treated may not be reliable.
A first way to improve the matching quality is to impose the so called common support restriction, i.e. drop those controls that have a propensity score lower than the minimum or higher than the maximum propensity score of the treated establishments and vice versa in order to ensure that the matched pairs are comparable. Another way consists in matching not only on the propensity score but additionally also on some covariates, like e.g. industrial sector.
Step two concerns the question how to construct a control group, i.e. how to define similarity between establishments. To this aim several procedures for matching on the 18 See e.g. .
propensity score have been suggested. In its most general formulation a matching estimator is given by
where w(i, j) represents the weight attached to the j-th non participating establishment.
The more similar the i-th and j-th establishments are regarding their propensity score, the higher the weight. Different matching estimators differ in the weights attached to non-participating establishments.
Nearest neighbor matching e.g. requires to choose for every participating establishment that out of the group of non-participating which is closest regarding its propensity score.
That is, the weighting function is given by:
with p i and p j as the propensity score for the i-th and j-th establishment, respectively.
It has also been suggested to use more than one non-treated establishment to construct the control group. Thereby establishments which are less similar are downweighted while higher weights are attached to those establishments which are more similar to the treated ones. The weighting function for this so called kernel matching is given by w
as a kernel function, e.g. the Gaussian normal distribution, and h as a bandwidth parameter which can be calculated using Silverman's rule of thumb:
.
19
An alternative estimation strategy to this non-parametrical matching approach are simple regression models, e.g. in our case where the dependent variable is binary, a probit model. Angrist (1998) notes that "the differences between regression and matching strategies for the estimation of treatment effects are partly cosmetic," since the approximation of any functional form imposed by a parametrical model like the probit model as well as the conditioning on the propensity score in the matching model can be improved by including more interaction terms in the estimation. Hence, the "manner in which covariates are accommodated is not the most important difference between the two models"
19 SD stands for the standard deviation, IQR for the interquartile range of the propensity score and N for the number of observations. Details can be found in Silverman (1986) .
but instead lies in the weighting scheme used to take the average between treated and controls at different values of the covariates.
Let us briefly sketch how regression models are related to the conditional independence assumptions given in (7). We assume the following probit model where y 1i indicates the outcome of the i-th establishment. Let us further assume that we neglect sample selection on observables and instead, additionally to an intercept, only include a dummy variable D i which indicates participation in a public subsidy:
As already mentioned, the independence assumption Y ⊥D will unlikely hold within a non-experimental environment. In reality it is more likely that there are observable covariates which are related to the outcome and the participation decision. These omitted variables will be reflected in so that any estimator for ∆ will be plagued by the omitted variable bias. If, however, the conditional independence assumption holds, and we also include observable covariates X in (10), then D⊥ |X and ∆ can be estimated free of any bias as it is the case for matching models. The only difference between the two approaches lies in the weighting schemes used to take the average between treated and controls at different values of the covariates. Angrist (1998) 
Estimation results
In the following we will present the results of a matching procedure and compare them with the results of a simple probit model. Our treatment variable, D i , is the fact whether the i-th establishment has received a public subsidy during 1997/1998 and our outcome Due to space limitations we will not present the detailed results of these estimations, but only some diagnostics to assess the quality of the estimated propensity score in the appendix (table 11) .
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In particular we will report LR-tests for the overall significance Ideally, we would like these kernels to look the same in the group of treated and nontreated establishments. Figure 4 in the appendix, however, reveals that this is only the 20 We use regional dummies for every federal state. Due to an insufficient number of observations we only considered 7 industry sectors. Details are available on request.
21 The detailed estimation results are available from the authors on request.
case for East-German establishments. The impression of heterogeneity between treated and control establishments is confirmed if we look at the share of subsidized and nonsubsidized establishments which had to be dropped due to the common support restriction.
The figures in table 5 range from 8% in the case of treated micro establishments to 43%
and 44% for non-treated and treated large establishments respectively.
For the estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated we used several approaches. We first conducted a one-to-one propensity score matching with common support restriction and replacement, i.e. each non-treated establishment may serve more than one time as a matched partner. In order to improve the matching quality, in a second step we additionally conditioned on the industrial sector.
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We conducted the estimation for the whole sample and also separately for West-and East-Germany and for different size classes. Finally we repeated all estimations but now using a Gauss kernel matching. Table 6 contains the results for the pooled estimation. Several points are worth mentioning. First, all estimated matching models yield a positive and significant average treatment effect on the treated ranging from 0.05 to 0.08 for the broad and from 0.11 to 0.12 for the narrow innovation concept. Hence, accounting for observable covariates, public subsidies increase the probability to improve or introduce new products by about 5 to 8%
and if one focuses only on new products by even 11 to 12%. Thereby the results become 22 Note that due to an insufficient number of observations conditioning on the industrial sector was not possible for different size groups. more significant if we condition not only on the propensity score but also on industrial affiliation. Using more than one non-treated establishment as matched partners, as it is the case with the kernel matching, increases the effects and their significance. Tables 12   and 13 in the appendix contain the analogous figures for West-and East-Germany and for different size classes respectively. The major stylized facts may be summarized as follows:
-In nearly all cases the ATE is positive and significant -The ATE is higher for the narrower defined innovation concept -The ATE is higher for East-than for West-German establishments -Subsidies have the highest effect on small and medium sized establishments -Kernel matching yields higher and more significant effects than one-to-one matching -Matching not only conditional on the propensity score but also on the industry sector yields higher and more significant effects -The only insignificant and even negative ATE is obtained for large establishments.
The reliability of all matching estimators, however, heavily depends on the balancing property of the propensity score. In order to check the quality of the matching, in table 5 we report the absolute standardized percentage bias of the covariates between treated and control establishments before and after the matching.
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The figures in table 5 reveal that before matching, the two groups are most heterogeneous in West-Germany (0.28) and more homogenous in the group of micro establishment with less than 10 employees (0.17). After the matching the differences are reduced considerably but still remain high for West-Germany (0.11) and for large establishments (0.20).
We already noted that an alternative proceeding to the matching approach consists in estimating a probit model with the innovation decision as the dependent and subsidies among other covariates as the exogenous variables. And we also already noted that the results of these two approaches will be similar if the values of p(D i = 1|X i ) are less than 0.5.
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Table 11 in the appendix contains in the last row the means and standard deviations 23 The absolute standardized bias was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and is defined for a single covariate x as follows: |(x(1) − x(0))/( [var(x(1)) + var(x(0))]/2| where x(1) (var(x(1))) is the mean (variance) of the covariate in the group of treated and x(0) (var(x(0))) the mean (variance) in the group of non-treated establishments. The figures in table 5 were obtained by taking the average over the covariates.
24 These results, however, are only valid for the case of linear models and thus may only be used as an approximation when a probit model is estimated. 
where again Y i indicates the innovation decision of the i-th establishment and D i whether it received a public subsidy.
The interested reader can find in the appendix a list of covariates contained in X and some reasons for their inclusion. We will not present all estimation results but only focus on the impact of subsidies, i.e. on the parameter estimates for ∆, and some diagnostics for the models.
25 Table 14 in the appendix contains along with various LR-tests the estimated parameters of ∆. To quantify the impact of public subsidies on innovations, we first of all report the marginal effect of D for a reference establishment according to:
Additionally we also calculate the average treatment effect on the treated given by:
i.e. the average difference between the probability that establishments would have introduced innovations if they had received a subsidy and the probability that establishments 25 Detailed results are available from the authors.
would have been innovative under no subsidy.
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The standard error of the marginal effect as well as the average treatment effect were calculated using the delta method. Details can be found in the appendix.
At this point it is sufficient to notice that our a priori expectations are confirmed, i.e.
that the probit models yield by and large the same estimates for the average treatment effect on the treated as the matching models. For East-German establishments e.g. the ATE under the matching model for the narrow defined innovation concept amounted to 6 to 12% depending on the concrete matching model used. The probit model on the other hand reports in this case a marginal effect of about 11% and an average treatment effect of 7%. Under the assumption that the sample selection mechanism is solely due to observable covariates, the results thus seem to be robust.
Sample selection on unobservable covariates
In the previous section we have introduced various econometric methods which can be used to estimate the effect of a treatment on an outcome variable in the presence of sample selection due to observable covariates. The methods differed regarding their parametrical assumptions but had one basic principle in common which could be summarized as follows:
If there are differences between treated and non-treated subjects which are visible in the data, then try to compare only those subjects which appear to be comparable in the sense of their observable attributes. Applying these methods revealed a significant and considerable positive impact of subsidies on innovation activities.
But what if, even after we have balanced the observable covariates, there are still differences between these two groups? Or stated differently, what if the conditional independence assumption which is the cornerstone of the matching as well as the probit estimation does not hold and hence the sample selection mechanism is not only due to observable but also to unobservable covariates? In our application it could be the case e.g.
that management ability or corporate culture play an important role in both determining the innovation behavior and the decision whether the establishment will successfully 26 We adopted the following reference establishment: All continuous variables are assumed to take on their mean values. Additionally we assume that the representative establishment does not possess a R&D-department, is a private limited company, operates in the transportion/telecommunication sector and is located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and accordingly in Thuringia for the sub-sample of East-German establishments. apply for a public subsidy or not. In this case the estimates would still be plagued by a "hidden" bias, upward we suspect, which could not be remedied by observable covariates, since both, management ability and corporate culture, are hardly quantifiable.
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In the following we will apply estimation strategies which can be used under these circumstances. Since in the last section we started with a nonparametrical approach, namely the matching estimation, in this section it will be the other way round, i.e. we first discuss the simultaneous probit model, which can also be interpreted as an instrumental variable approach, and then turn to its nonparametrical counterpart, the conditional difference-in-differences estimator (see also figure 2). The instrumental variable approach is attractive for at least one reason: The source of identifying information is transparent and accessible to testing as we will see.
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This stands in contrast to both experimental and non-experimental approaches which, as Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) put it, "require assumptions that cannot be tested without collecting data specifically designed to test the assumptions of the model."
The use of probit models was justified previously by the conditional independence 27 We believe that sample selection due to unobservables plays a dominant role especially in the case of establishment data. The assumption of conditional independence assumption may be more plausible in the classical evaluation literature where the researcher has access to exhaustive individual employer data.
28 See Angrist (1991).
assumption. Under this assumption, the included dummy variable for public subsidies, D i , will not be correlated with the error term, i , and hence the impact of subsidies on the outcome could be estimated free of any omitted variable bias. If the sample selection process, however, is due to unobservable characteristics, these unobservable variables will be reflected in i and hence there will still be a potential correlation between D i and i .
As a consequence, D i will be endogenous. We will therefore start with an exogeneity test proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and then try to find some appropriate instruments for this endogenous dummy variable.
The aim of Rivers and Vuong (1998) 
with y 1i = I(y * 1i ) and cov( 1i , 2i ) = σ 12 . Rivers and Vuong (1998) propose the following two-step estimation approach:
1. Regress y 2i on x 2i to obtain β 2 and the estimated residuals 2i = y 2i − x 2i β 2 .
2. Conduct a probit analysis with y 1i as the dependent and X 1i , y 2i and 2i as the explanatory variables.
The included residual in the second step, 2i , accounts for the endogeneity of y 2i but additionally may also be used as an exogeneity test of y 2i . If namely the parameter of 2i is significant, the null hypothesis of exogeneity must be rejected. Thereby the significance of 2i may be tested by a simple t-test or alternatively by conducting a LR-test or a Wald test.
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Another nice feature is the fact that under H 0 the distribution of 2i has no impact on the first probit equation and hence the test is also valid without assuming normality of 2i .
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It can therefore also be applied in cases where the second equation is of a probit 29 Details can be found in Rivers and Vuong (1988) . 30 See e.g. Wooldridge (2001) . type as in our application: Equation (16) was estimated to obtain the propensity score for the matching while equation (15) was estimated as its nonparametrical counterpart. But now we allow these two equations to be connected with each other via the disturbances, 1i and 2i , for which we assume that
The following a small sample size we are not able to follow up large establishments. The same set of exogenous variables for X 1i and X 2i was used as before. One can see that for the narrow innovation concept all tests reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of the treatment decision.
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For the broad innovation concept the LR-test always rejects exogeneity while the t-test
and the Wald-test are only significant in the case of East-German establishments. It thus seems that although we account for sample selection on observables, nevertheless the treatment decision is still endogenous and thus the two equations (15) and (16) need to be estimated simultaneously.
Simultaneous probit model
Equations (15) and (16) The model in (15) and (16) will be estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood although a first and tempting approach might be to use some seemingly "obvious" twostep approaches, where in a first step (16) is estimated by usual probit and the obtained prediction Φ( β 2 x 2i ) used as an instrument for D i in a second step. However, such a pro-33 For a more thorough discussion of mixed simultaneous equation models see Blundell and Smith (1993, 1994) . For an application see Hujer, Caliendo, and Radić (2002) . 34 For details see e.g. Schmidt (1990) .
ceeding is only valid if we included E(D
Otherwise, since Φ(·) is a nonlinear function, the expected value of D i cannot be passed through and thus we have to derive the likelihood function of (15) and (16).
Let us to this aim additionally to (17) assume that:
i.e. our residuals follow a standard bivariate normal distribution which is solely determined by the correlation coefficient ρ. The likelihood function is then given by:
Let Φ 2 (·) be the bivariate cumulative standard normal distribution function. Then:
Maximization of (19) yields finally the ML-estimates of the parameters.
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Again due to space limitations we will not present all estimation results in this paper. Table 15 However, the previously conducted exogeneity test pointed to the view that the treatment decision is still in fact endogenous and therefore the estimation results are plagued by an observational bias.
If we additionally account for sample selection due to unobservables, the results change dramatically. For the pooled estimation e.g. we found, using initially the matching approach, a significant average treatment effect on the treated of 5 to 8% for the broad and 11 to 12% for the narrow innovation concept. Now, this effect becomes negative and amounts 35 See e.g. Maddala (1983) or Wooldridge (2001) . Angrist (1991) , however, shows in a monte carlo experiment that especially in large samples, linear instrumental variable estimators perform nearly as well as the correctly specified ML-estimator.
36 See e.g. Maddala (1983) but note the small misprint in the derivation of the likelihood function there! 37 The estimation was done using STATA. Codes and detailed estimation results are available from the authors.
to -20% and -17% respectively! And the reason for this reversing sign is a positive and significant correlation between the treatment and innovation equation (ρ = 0.51/0.64). It thus seems that there are unobservable covariates which have a positive impact on both the subsidy and the innovation decision and which, if we do not account for them, will lead to an overestimation of the true treatment effect.
This result can be generalized to the other sub-samples as well. We found evidence that in all cases there is a substantial correlation between the two equations and hence the previous positive average treatment effects turn out to be overestimated. For West-German and for small and medium sized establishments we now get negative results whereas in the case of micro establishments the results become insignificant. The only remarkable exception are East-German establishments. Conditioning only on observable covariates as we did in the previous section yielded an average treatment effect on the treated of 2 to 11% for the broad and 6 to 12% for the narrow innovation concept. However, assuming that public subsidies are still endogenous, we now find a negative self selection due to unobservables (ρ = -0.61/-0.45) and hence the estimated effects even increase to 39% for the broad and 31% for the narrow innovation concept.
An obvious question at this point concerns the reliability of these results. Having found convincing evidence for endogeneity of the treatment decision, the more crucial question is whether our simultaneous probit model is able to mitigate this endogeneity. To this aim note that the model contained in equations (15) and X 2i which can be found in the tables 4 and 10, one can see that these are by and large the same exogenous variables. However, the variables contained in (15) refer to the year 1998 while the instruments refer to the year 1996. Our model is thus identified, but to be optimal and valid instruments, the exogenous variables in X 2i must satisfy the following two conditions: First, they must be significant in the participation equation (16) and second, they must be insignificant in the outcome equation (15).
In the following we conducted an informative test to check the validity of the instruments. In order to check whether X 2i is informative for D i , we estimated a simple probit with D i as the dependent and X 2i as the independent variables and conducted a LR-test for the overall significance of X 2i . In a second step we tested whether X 2i has any explana-tory power for the outcome equation by estimating a probit with Y i as the dependent and X 1i and X 2i as the independent variables. Again we conducted a LR-test for the joint significance of X 2i . Table 8 contains the results of these LR-tests and although this is just an intuitive test, we find convincing support for the validity of our instruments. Only for micro establishments using the broad innovation concept as the outcome variable, the instruments have also explanatory power in the outcome equation and thus may still be correlated with the error term. In all other cases, however, they are highly significant in the participation but insignificant in the outcome equation.
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Nonparametrical crosscheck
Our access to longitudinal data is limited. In particular we do not have regular information about the outcome decision. The foregoing time period for which such information is available refers to 1996/1997 and hence overlaps with the treatment period. The following considerations must therefore be treated with caution. One often used empirical strategy in the presence of individual specific but unobservable effects is to compare the innovation activity of an establishment after the treatment with the innovation activity of the same establishment before the treatment. The idea behind this strategy is that the outcome of an establishment before treatment might be a good proxy for the counterfactual outcome of no treatment. 
Applying this simple comparison yields thus a negative impact of subsidies on the innovation activities.
This simple before-after-estimator, however, has one major drawback. It assumes that unobservable covariates average out over time, i.e. it assumes that the mean of the outcome variable is time invariant. This assumption is questionable especially in our context since innovation activities are sensitive to changing overall economic circumstances. An extension is the difference-in-differences estimator which also uses information about nontreated establishments and assumes that the following identifying assumption holds:
Equation (22) states that the mean change in the outcome variable under no treatment is the same for subsidized and non-subsidized establishments.
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If this assumption is valid, the difference-in-differences estimator can be applied:
which in our case yields a positive impact, namely: -6.21% + 8.97% = 2.75%. The difference-in-differences estimator assumes that sample selection is solely due to unobservable, linear and time invariant effects. An extension is the conditional difference-indifferences estimator which additionally also controls for observables and ensures that only individuals are matched with the same observable characteristics.
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In particular the con-
with N 0 as the number of matched controls and w(i, j) as the weight attached to the j-th non-participating establishment depending on the difference of the propensity scores for the i-th and j-th establishment. The following table 9 contains the results of the conditional difference-in-differences estimator. The estimation was conducted conditional on the same propensity score as previously and by using an one-to-one and Gaussian kernel matching approach, respectively. 39 For more details see Meyer (1995) . 40 See Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) and for an application Hujer, Caliendo and Radić (2001) .
The results reveal that in most of the cases, except for small and medium sized establishments where we found a weak significant and positive impact, the average treatment effect on the treated is insignificant. We once again repeat that these results have to be treated with caution since due to data limitations the treatment period overlaps with the pre-treatment outcome period, but we also find support for our previous empirical findings, where the estimated treatment effects turned out to be insignificant or even negative if we additionally condition on unobservables.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to add another piece of evidence to the ongoing political 'evergreen'-debate about the necessity to reduce public deficits by decreasing public subsidies as one means. Although there is broad consensus about this point, the dispute which programs should be concerned is still ongoing and controversial. An often raised objection in that context is that public R&D subsidies should be excluded from this reduction since they are helpful to stimulate technological change and innovations. Despite the considerable amount spent in this area, the number of evaluations which try to assess the impact of such programs, however, is rather limited.
In this paper we applied various microeconometric methods to overcome the inherent sample selection problem in estimating the effect of public subsidies on the innovation capacity of German establishments. We are tempted to accompany Klette, Møen, and Griliches (2000) , who stated that "in some ways we feel we are as confused as ever, but we believe we are confused on a higher level and about more important things." We started with a simple mean comparison which yielded significant positive impacts. We then accounted for sample selection due to observable characteristics by employing a parametrical multivariate probit and a nonparametrical matching estimation. The result was a reduction in the effects which, however, still pointed to the view that public subsidies have a positive impact on innovations with differences for West-and East-Germany and different size classes.
Finally, we were able to show that especially with establishment data one has to take sample selection due to unobservables into account as well. Estimating a simultaneous probit and a conditional difference-in-differences model changed the results dramatically.
We only find positive effects for East-Germany whereas in all other cases the results are at most insignificant.
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Obviously there are various unobservable determinants which have a positive impact on the outcome as well as the participation decision. If we do not account for these effects, the impact of subsidies will be over-estimated. But what are the reasons for these negative microeconomic effects? One explanation might be that private capital is more efficient and productive than public subsidies.
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The better monitoring of private lenders could have an enhancing impact on the success probability of innovations.
An alternative explanation might be that the relation between private and public R&D-spending is complementary, and that public subsidies crowd out private R&D-activities.
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Whatever the true explanation might be, an upshot of all the estimations is the following:
The more observable and unobservable factors one takes into account in order to make treated and control establishments more comparable, the smaller the estimated treatment effect of subsidies on innovations becomes.
Of course we are aware that there are several limitations and drawbacks which have to be taken into account. In this paper we have only considered one kind of heterogeneity, namely with regard to West-and East-Germany and regarding different size classes. Other equally important types of heterogeneity which were not addressed in this paper are, however, program heterogeneity and heterogeneity regarding the time structure. It could be the case that different measures have a different treatment effect and hence a multiple treatment framework would be more appropriate.
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Another point concerns the assumed time structure. In this study we abstracted from the possibility that there might be more variable lag structures in the sense that subsidies granted in one year reveal their effect only with a delay in the subsequent years. Additionally it might also be the case that different "dosing schemes", i.e. the fact whether establishments received only once a subsidy or more than one time, might have a different impact on the outcome variable.
One has also to keep in mind that a microeconometric evaluation like this one is only a 41 This finding is supported by the results of Czarnitzki (2001) and Almus and Czarnitzki (2002) . The other findings which stand in contrast to Czarnitzki and Fier (2002) and to Licht and Stadler (2003) can only be explained by the different empirical strategy used which takes sample selection on unobservables into account as well. 42 We owe these valuable suggestions to Alexander Schulz. 43 An alternative explanation that especially applies to smaller establishments is that the number of employees devoted to R&D is constraint and that there might be a trade-off between the effort devoted to R&D and the application for public subsidies.
44 See e.g. Lechner (2002) . Note, however, that limitations in the number of observations hindered us to conduct such an analysis. first step to evaluate the total net effect of public subsidies on the innovation activities. We have shown that only under the assumption of no spill over effects, these microeconometric findings can be generalized to the whole economy.
Despite all these caveat, we think that it is justified to close with the following quote of Lichtenberg (1984) who also found, after accounting for unobservable heterogeneity, unsatisfactory impacts of public R&D subsidies for the United States: "These findings thus make heavier the burden of proof on those who would claim that federal contract R&D makes a positive contribution to aggregate technical progress."
A Justification of the average treatment effect on the treated
The average treatment effect on the treated plays a prominent role in the practical evaluation literature. But is it also a parameter of interest for us, i.e. can its use be justified in our application? To this aim let us assume that the government has control over the policy variable ϕ which defines the scope of participants, i.e. ϕ is related to the number of subsidized as well as to non-subsidized establishments.
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If N 1 is the number of subsidized, N 0 the number of non-subsidized and N the total number of establishments, then
Assume now that we can abstract from general equilibrium effects, i.e. we neglect that the decision about the scope of participating firms, ϕ, might have an impact on the outcome of a single firm.
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This assumption seems justifiable in our case since the amount of all public R&D-subsidies in Germany in 2000 only made up 5.2% of total R&D-spending. As a consequence, the expected effect of public subsidies at level ϕ on the level of total macroeconomic innovation activities, E[Y (ϕ)], is given by
and the optimum level of ϕ is determined by the first derivative of (25) with respect to ϕ
The expression inside the bracket can be estimated by taking the mean differences between the output of subsidized and non-subsidized establishments, i.e by the use of
. But what about the average treatment effect on the treated? In the following
we will derive what the average treatment effect on the treated actually measures and whether this parameter is of any interest for us.
The average treatment effect on the treated reflects in our case the net effect on the innovation activities of the whole economy from the existence of a program at level ϕ 45 We abstract at this point from costs associated with the implementation and conduction of such programs. For more details see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) . 46 We will also abstain from any selection mechanism, i.e. abstract from any covariates that might play a role in the determination of the outcome variable. This will not alter the general conclusion of the following considerations but only facilitate the notation.
compared to the alternative of shutting down all programs:
In this sense it is an "all or nothing" evaluation.
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Since N 1 (0) = 0, N 0 (0) = N and
Assuming now that the decision to participate in an R&D subsidy depends on ϕ, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) have shown that at the optimum level the marginal effect from participation is equal to non-participation which implies
. Hence the result of the "all or nothing" evaluation can be rewritten as
which gives us finally a justification of the average treatment effect on the treated: If we can abstain from general equilibrium effect and assume that the utility of the marginal entrant into the model is zero, the average treatment effect on the treated gives us the net effect of the program on the outcome variable as compared to the alternative scenario of no program.
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If it is positive, conducting the program is efficient. However, we have to keep in mind that ∆ AT E|D says nothing about the optimal level ϕ.
47 See Heckman et.al. (1999) . 48 In all other cases, however, as Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) stated, the average treatment effect on the treated is inappropriate for evaluating the effect of a policy change.
B Variables used for the innovation outcome equation
There is a vast literature about the determinants of innovations.
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A useful classification is a differentiation between firm and market specific factors. Market factors include e.g. the competition intensity, market concentration, exposure to international trade but also demand factors, like profitability and expected development of the business volume which are all expected to have an innovation enhancing impact (see also table 10). ities include e.g. the state of technology, the existence of an R&D department, the share of high qualified employees and employees devoted to R&D. Other firm specific factors which were also included in the estimation are the size of establishments measured by the number and squared number of employees, industrial and regional dummies.
49 for an overview see e.g. Cohen (1998).
C Calculation of the standard errors using the delta method
In the following we will briefly describe how the standard errors of (12) and (13) The delta method states that the variance of G(θ) can be approximated using a first order Taylor series:
with ∇ θ G(θ) as the gradient of G with respect to θ.
For the marginal effect given in (12), ∇ θ G(θ) is given by: 
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